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Uganda has made significant progress in codifying the rights of access to 
information (ATI) and participation, and toward putting in place the 
institutional infrastructure, including a regulatory framework, for the oil 
sector. Political roll-backs that are re-concentrating power in the execu-
tive branch of government and the growing scale of known oil reserves, 
however, may jeopardize these advances. In this context, the passage of a 
new law in the United States requiring companies that file annual reports 
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to disclose the 
payments they make to host governments for the extraction of oil, natural 
gas and minerals, could help shore up transparency around investment in 
Uganda’s extractives industry and avoid the failures in governance that 
have exposed other countries to the “resource curse.”
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INTRODUCTION 
On 21 July 2010, U.S. President Barack Obama signed into 
law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act1 (hereafter the Wall Street Reform Act). A 
landmark transparency provision (Section 1504, referred to 
as the Cardin-Lugar Transparency Provision) near the end 
of the 2,300+ page Act requires “…each resource extraction 
issuer to include in an annual report of the resource 
extraction issuer information relating to any payment made 
by the resource extraction issuer, a subsidiary of the 
resource extraction issuer, or an entity under the control of 
the resource extraction issuer to a foreign government of 
the Federal Government for the purpose of the commercial 
development of oil, natural gas, or minerals…”
Twenty-nine of the world’s 32 largest international oil 
companies2 and eight of the world’s 10 largest mining 
companies are registered and file annual reports with the 
SEC (Box 1). These companies are engaged in all aspects 
of work related to oil, natural gas and minerals including 
exploration, extraction, processing, transportation and 
export. As a result, the Wall Street Reform Act can bring 
some much-needed transparency to the extractive resources 
industry and to the governments of resource-rich nations. 
By requiring the disclosure of payments to governments, 
the Act—if effectively implemented and enforced3—will 
make it possible for individuals, institutions and other 
stakeholders to track public revenues from extractive 
resources more accurately. Such transparency can help 
citizens and civil society hold governments accountable, 
promote good governance and development, and, in doing 
so, help avoid the “resource curse” (Box 2). 
In his address to the United Nations summit4 on the 
Millennium Development Goals in September 2010, 
President Obama highlighted this provision in the new U.S. 
law by stating, “We know that countries are more likely to 
prosper when governments are accountable to their people. 
So we are leading a global effort to combat corruption—
which in many places is the single greatest barrier to 
prosperity, and which is a profound violation of human 
rights. That’s why we now require oil, gas and mining 
companies that raise capital in the United States to disclose 
all payments they make to foreign governments. And it’s 
why I urged the G-20 to put corruption on its agenda and 
make it harder for corrupt officials to steal from their 
people and stifle their development.”
Box 1 | Filing Reports with the SEC
The SEC regulates the U.S. financial sector and is a 
principal source of information on companies for investors. 
Many companies file reports with the SEC, although not all 
registered businesses file annual reports. Many U.S. and 
foreign companies are registered with the SEC in ways 
that do not require them to file annual reports, only 
less-comprehensive reports. Companies must be 
registered and file annual reports with the SEC in order to 
trade on US platforms, such as the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE)1 and NASDAQ.2 Some companies 
trade on both US and foreign platforms such as the 
London Stock Exchange.3 Other companies are listed only 
on a foreign exchange and may or may not file annual 
reports with the SEC.
Sources: Additional information on the NYSE available online at: 
http://www.nyse.com/. Additional information on NASDAQ available 
online at: http://www.nasdaq.com/. Additional information on the 
London Stock Exchange available online at: http://www.
londonstockexchange.com/home/homepage.htm. 
Box 2 | What is the Resource Curse?
Many of the world’s poor live in countries with significant 
reserves of oil, natural gas and mineral resources. Despite 
the abundance of natural resources, especially point-source 
non-renewable resources (e.g., oil, gas, minerals), a 
number of these countries tend to experience lower rates of 
economic growth (e.g., lower GDP per capita) and poorer 
development outcomes than countries with fewer natural 
resources. This “resource curse” is attributed to various 
causes, including: 1) a decline in the competitiveness of 
other economic sectors (caused by appreciation of the real 
exchange rate as resource revenues enter an economy); 2) 
volatility of revenues from the natural resource sector due to 
exposure to global commodity market swings; 3) govern-
ment mismanagement of resources; and/or 4) weak, ineffec-
tual, unstable or corrupt institutions (possibly due to the 
easily diverted actual or anticipated revenue stream from 
extractive activities). 
Sources: Our work/issues – Revenue Transparency, Revenue 
Watch, online at: http://www.revenuewatch.org/our-work/issues/
revenue-transparency-0. Ross, Michael L., “The Political Economy of 
the Resource Curse,” World Politics 51 (January 1999), p 297-322, 
online at: http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/paper.pdf. 
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By effectively applying Section 1504 of the Wall Street 
Reform Act to the activities of companies that operate 
internationally and file annual reports with the SEC, this 
law can be put to the test in Uganda, a country that is 
quickly emerging as one of Africa’s petro-states. 
NEW OIL DISCOVERIES IN UGANDA
In 2006, commercially-viable quantities of oil were found 
in the Albertine Graben in western Uganda. The Albertine 
Graben, the northern portion of the Albertine Rift,5  stretch-
es from the border of Uganda, Sudan and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) in the north to Lake Edward on 
the Uganda-DRC border in the south—a distance of over 
500 kilometers and an area of about 23,000 square kilome-
ters.  
The Ugandan government has established nine oil prospect-
ing blocks in the Albertine Graben, of which five blocks 
have been allocated to oil companies for prospecting 
purposes (Figure 1).6  By mid-2009, over $700 million had 
been spent on oil exploration in the region. Oil companies 
have drilled in only three of the nine exploration blocks, 
but have already found more than 2.5 billion barrels of oil. 
Some analysts estimate that Uganda’s Albertine Graben 
may hold more than 6 billion barrels of oil.7 Projected 
production of 100,000 to 150,000 barrels per day would 
significantly increase revenues for the government and, if 
well managed and invested, could improve economic 
growth, reduce poverty and promote development in 
Uganda. (In 2009, Uganda’s Gross Domestic Product was 
U.S. $15,736  million.)8
But the oil sector can also have significant adverse affects 
on poor people and local environments. According to the 
Uganda National Household Survey of 2005/2006,9 84.6% 
of the population is rural, and 31.1% lives in poverty. 
Uganda’s poor, rural populations, including those that live 
in the oil districts, depend on land and natural resources for 
their livelihood. Environmental degradation from the oil 
sector (e.g., from exploration, extraction, processing and 
transportation) as well as associated socio-economic 
developments (e.g., in-migration, new infrastructure, 
businesses and housing) can result in the loss of liveli-
hoods, displacement and poverty. Ensuring the integrity of 
ecosystems and natural resources in this region is essential 
to securing local wellbeing. 
The Albertine Rift is also the most species-rich eco-region 
in Africa and harbors more endemic species than any other 
area on the continent, including the rare mountain gorilla. 
Some scientists have estimated that this region is home to 
39% of Africa’s mammal species, 51% of its bird species, 
19% of its amphibian species and 14% of its plant and 
reptile species. As a result, the Albertine Rift has a large 
number of protected areas, including fully-protected 
national parks and multiple-use forest reserves and wildlife 
sanctuaries. A number of parks are partly or wholly inside 
the oil blocks and many others that lie outside the blocks 
will likely be affected by oil development. Oil exploration 
activities, including drilling (and mining10), are already 
taking place in several parks, including Murchison Falls 
National Park—the largest park in Uganda.
TWO SIDES TO TRANSPARENCY IN UGANDA
Positive Developments
The extent to which Uganda’s existing laws and policies 
will bring transparency and accountability to Uganda’s oil 
industry is unclear. On one hand, Uganda’s Constitution, 
Figure 1 | Map of Uganda and DRC Oil in the Albertine Graben
Source: World-Class East Africa oil Exploration Play, Africa Oil 
Corp., Major New East African Analogue, p 4, online at: http://
www.africaoilcorp.com/i/pdf/brochure_may09.pdf.
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Access to Information (ATI) Act and other laws are 
generously pro-disclosured when compared to international 
standards. Under the Constitution,11 “[e]very citizen has a 
right of access to information in the possession of the State 
or any other organ or agency of the State except where the 
release of the information is likely to prejudice the security 
or sovereignty of the State or interfere with the right to the 
privacy of any other person.” 
Uganda is one of only six countries in Africa with a 
comprehensive freedom of information law.12  The ATI 
Act13 was approved in 2005 and went into effect in 2006. 
Similar to the Constitution, the ATI Act provides that every 
citizen has a right of access to government-held informa-
tion and echoes the same two exceptions: national security 
or sovereignty, and individual privacy.14  The government is 
currently developing regulations to help implement the Act.
Uganda’s National Oil and Gas Policy,15 approved by 
Cabinet in February 2008, recognizes that “Openness and 
access to information are fundamental rights in activities 
that may positively or negatively impact individuals, 
communities and states…The policy shall therefore 
promote high standards of transparency and accountability 
in licensing, procurement, exploration, development and 
production operations as well as management of revenues 
from oil and gas. The policy will also support disclosure of 
payments and revenues from oil and gas using simple and 
easily understood principles in line with accepted national 
and international financial reporting standards.” The Policy 
is consistent with the internationally-recognized Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI)16 disclosure stan-
dards. EITI, launched by the United Kingdom in 2002, is a 
voluntary approach to transparency. It has achieved some 
success in a few countries, but its overall record is patchy.
Further, public statements on the management and use of 
oil revenues by Uganda’s President H.E. Yoweri Kaguta 
Museveni and other senior government officials are 
consistent with these laws and policies. For example, in his 
New Year 2010 Address to the Nation,17 President Musev-
eni spoke of the importance of managing oil revenues to 
promote economic growth: “[t]he Government recognizes 
the critical importance of managing oil resources well, to 
avoid the mistakes many other countries have faced.” He 
went on to say that “[t]he key element in these legislations 
will be to ensure transparency and accountability in the 
production and utilization of oil resources” (Box 3).
Just days later on 12 January 2010, at a conference of the 
ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party, 
President Museveni repeated18 many of these same mes-
sages, but added, “Oil money should never be used to pay 
wages – should never be used for recurrent expenditure or 
to support consumption. It should be used to create a higher 
capacity…I do not have the same intoxication with oil as 
some of the less discerning people seem to. Petroleum is 
not more important than agriculture, industry, services and 
a developed human resource.” 
Taken together, these laws, policies and statements suggest 
that Uganda’s oil sector, including oil revenues, will be 
managed in an open and transparent manner to ensure 
accountability. 
Setbacks and Secrecy
On the other hand, certain developments are disconcerting 
and warrant attention. In 2005, the 1995 Constitution was 
amended to provide for a multi-party political system, but it 
also lifted presidential term limits and vested the rights of 
all minerals, oil and natural gas in the government (the 
1995 Constitution was silent on the ownership of extractive 
resources). The 2005 constitutional amendment (Section 
244(1)) declares, “The entire property in, and the control 
of, all minerals and petroleum in, on or under, any land or 
waters in Uganda are vested in the Government…” These 
resources were vested in the government on the justification 
that it facilitates extraction and promotes national develop-
ment. 
Following unrest in the oil districts, including confrontation 
with DRC, both governments established new military 
bases near Lake Albert. Uganda’s oil fields are protected by 
Special Forces under the command of Lt. Col. Muhoozi 
Kainerugaba,19 the son of President Museveni. Special 
government permission is now needed to visit the oil sites, 
even to speak to local authorities or local farmers or herders 
in the oil districts. Authorization for local NGOs to conduct 
research, interview local people, take photographs or 
monitor oil developments is difficult to acquire. Collec-
tively, these developments are worrisome because central-
ized decision-making authority over high-value natural 
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resources, especially the concentration of power over 
extractive industries, has contributed to the resource curse 
in other countries.
The Official Secrets Act of 1964,20 which provides for 
secrecy in matters such as security and defense, was not 
repealed by the ATI Act and remains in place. This Act 
creates barriers to citizen access to a broad range of 
government-held information that many advocates argue 
does not interfere with the security of the state. Officially, 
the Minister speaks on behalf of the ministry, and all 
government officers take an oath prohibiting them for 
disclosing information that comes to them by virtue of their 
offices. The Act prescribes severe criminal penalties for the 
unauthorized disclosure of “secret” or “classified” informa-
tion by public officers. 
As a result of the vague and broad formulation of the 
Official Secrets Act, public officials regard much of the 
information held by government agencies as “secret” or 
“confidential.” It creates a presumption that the disclosure 
of any information by a public official is unauthorized 
irrespective of the intention behind such disclosure, such 
that public officials are forced to err on the side of caution 
by routinely withholding all information, however trivial. 
The Act has created a “culture of secrecy” amongst civil 
servants who are reluctant to disclose information related to 
government activities.21  
Also problematic, on 12 May 2010, the first of three new 
petroleum bills promised by President Museveni was 
released to the public for review and comments: the 
Petroleum (Exploration, Development, Production, and 
Value Addition) Bill. This bill focuses on exploration and 
extraction while the other bills are expected to address 
revenue management and reinvestment, among other 
matters.Ugandan non-governmental organizations, Ugan-
da’s Civil Society Coalition on Oil (CSCO), international 
organizations22 and academics23 have raised concerns that 
the Petroleum Bill lacks significant and sufficient checks 
and balances on the government’s authorities over oil, and 
will lead to corruption and abuse of office. 
Advocates have argued24 that the Petroleum Bill includes 
several provisions that will allow the government to 
classify important oil sector information as confidential and 
withhold it from the public domain. These provisions 
include:
Box 3 | President Museveni’s Remarks Regarding Uganda’s Oil Resources in his Address to the Nation, 31 December 2009
“The development of oil resources will go hand in hand with the continued efforts to develop other sectors of the economy – that is, 
the diversification of the economy will continue to be among the top priorities of Government in spite of the oil wealth. The Govern-
ment recognizes the critical importance of managing oil resources well, to avoid the mistakes many other countries have faced.
Hence, Government will ensure that these resources are managed in a manner that facilitates sustainable development and avoids 
distortions, such as a sharply appreciated exchange rate, which would destroy other sectors of the economy by making them 
uncompetitive in terms of export. In other words, oil and gas resources will be managed in a manner that is consistent with the 
macroeconomic framework of the country.
Since oil is a finite resource, oil revenues will be used to develop durable and competitive competencies that will increase productiv-
ity in key sectors of the economy. Thus, oil revenues will be invested in key non-oil sectors for productivity enhancement. The key 
priority sectors for development using oil revenues are as follows:-
1. energy infrastructure including enhancing electricity generation, and transmission capacity and rural electrification;
2. rail transport and major road infrastructure;
3. small, medium and large irrigation schemes to ensure availability of water for agricultural production;
4. science and technology including enhancing technical and vocational education to avail requisite skills for a modern economy.
This means that oil revenues will be ring-fenced to ensure value for money and used mainly for the above-mentioned key priorities 
countrywide. Oil revenues, therefore, shall not be used for consumption but for durable investments that will benefit future genera-
tions. Oil and gas activities will provide opportunities for both forward and backward linkages in the country’s quest for industrializa-
tion. Having achieved significant progress in the areas of oil exploration, Government is now going to concertedly focus on Oil 
Management issues.  I am, therefore, directing the Minister of Finance to lead the coordination of oil management issues forthwith 
in consultation with the Minister of Energy and the Governor of the Bank of Uganda.”
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Government-held Information. Sections 153 and 155 of 
the Petroleum Bill itemize certain information that the 
holder of a license in oil exploration, production, trading, 
refining, processing, transportation and storage “shall 
keep at an address in Uganda notified to the Authority,” 
but not file with the government. This includes informa-
tion on the quantities of oil and natural gas extracted, 
produced and consumed or flared.25  Section 153 also 
provides a separate list of information that must be 
submitted to the government.  It is not clear why all such 
information is not required to be submitted directly to the 
government.26 The practice, however, has particular 
significance because Uganda’s ATI Act only gives 
citizens a right of ATI that is in the possession of the state 
or a government authority. The ATI Act does not apply to 
information held by private citizens or private compa-
nies.
Scope of Confidentiality. Section 156 of the Petroleum 
Bill provides, “subject to confidentiality of the data and 
commercial interests,” that some information will be 
made available to the public, including “details of all 
agreements, licences and any amendments,” licenses and 
approved field development plans.27  The Petroleum Bill, 
however, does not delineate the scope of “confidentiality 
of the data and commercial interests,” leaving it subject 
to interpretation by government officials that could 
prevent disclosure in many cases (given the Official 
Secrets Act). For example, it is unclear if information 
regarding production levels, revenue generated by the 
industry, company payments to government and other oil 
information would be released to the public. 
Confidential Information by Default. Section 156 of the 
Petroleum Bill states that all information submitted by 
the license holder to the government “[e]xcept as 
provided under this Act and the Access to Information 
Act, 2005” shall be kept confidential.28  This provision 
creates a presumption of “confidentiality” that places the 
burden of showing why any requested information should 
be disclosed on the public. Experience shows that once 
information is identified as confidential, it becomes 
exceedingly difficult to argue for reclassification as 
non-confidential. In contrast, a presumption in favor of 
disclosure assumes the benefit of releasing information to 
the public outweighs the costs to government and license 
holders, and places the burden on the state to justify why 
withholding it is warranted.
Educating communities in Uganda’s Lake Albert Region about the impacts of oil production (Robert Byaruhanga)
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Period of Time. Section 84 of the Petroleum Bill requires 
that all confidential information be withheld for the 
period of time as “specified in the license or other 
agreements.” 29 This exemption of records or data for 
periods of time prescribed in licenses, rather than in 
legislation, is inconsistent with ATI best practices30 and 
subjects the disclosure of information to the administra-
tive discretion (potentially unfettered) of individual 
government officials. Time periods prescribed in law 
ensure parliamentary determination and oversight.
Penalty for Releasing Information. Section 165 of the 
Petroleum Bill makes it a crime to release confidential 
information and provides for criminal penalties: “a fine 
not exceeding five hundred currency points or imprison-
ment not exceeding five years or both” (the cost of each 
point is established in a separate Schedule to allow for 
regular updating).31  This provision establishes a signifi-
cant penalty for the release of information that in many 
countries is not classified as confidential and, in fact, is 
consistently released to the public. As with the Official 
Secrets Act, it also creates a powerful incentive for 
government officials to err on the side of withholding 
information from the public.32
Many advocates have argued that the ATI provisions in the 
Petroleum Bill are more restrictive than—and therefore not 
consistent with—the ATI Act and are not in the spirit of the 
ATI provisions in the Constitution. Moreover, they assert 
that the provisions are unnecessary because the Constitu-
tion contains existing qualified disclosure exemptions, 
“where the release of the information is likely to prejudice 
the security or sovereignty of the State or interfere with the 
right to the privacy of any other person.”  
The ATI Act provides an interpretation and sets forth 
specific exemptions. Information officers can refuse a 
request for information in cases that involve the protection 
of privacy (Section 26), commercial competitiveness 
(Section 27);33  duty of confidence (Section 28);34  safety of 
individuals (Section 29); law enforcement and legal 
procedures (Section 30); records privileged from produc-
tion in legal proceedings (Section 31); defense, security and 
international relations (Section 32); and operations of 
public bodies (Section 33). 
The ATI Act also provides a clear balancing test to deter-
mine whether information should be classified as confiden-
tial or released to the public. Section 34 provides that 
information should be released to the public if there is “an 
imminent or serious public safety, public health or environ-
mental risk” or if “the public interest in the disclosure of 
the record is greater than the harm contemplated in the 
provision in question.” 35 These standards are consistent 
with ATI best practice and international norms.
Given the exemptions already provided under the ATI Act, 
the new confidentiality clauses in the Petroleum Bill must 
be looked at with close scrutiny. This is particularly 
important since the exemptions in the Petroleum Bill 
appear to be more restrictive (in terms of ATI and favoring 
disclosure) than those articulated in the ATI Act. ATI best 
practice suggests that additional exemptions should only be 
included within another law where the restrictions can be 
justified on the basis of strict tests of legitimacy and 
necessity. That is, the information must relate to a legiti-
mate purpose or objective set forth in the law. For example, 
disclosure must threaten to cause substantial harm to a 
government purpose or objective which outweighs the 
public interest in access to such information. Advocates 
have argued that the exemptions in the Petroleum Bill do 
not meet this test.
ATI IN PRACTICE
The government has not released to the public —or even 
the Parliament36— important information regarding the oil 
sector, including the five Production Sharing Agreements 
(PSAs)37 with the oil exploration companies. The govern-
ment has argued that the disclosure of information in the 
PSAs would reduce its negotiating position in the allocation 
of the remaining oil exploration blocks in the Albertine 
Graben (due to be allocated in early 2011).38  The govern-
ment also claims that the PSAs are protected under the 
trade secrecy provision of the ATI Act and has used this 
provision to justify its rejection of applications for the 
release of the PSAs. 
To allay public concerns, the government stated that the 
terms in the PSAs are consistent with international practice 
and provided a model PSA. Later, however, civil society 
groups acquired parts of at least one PSA39 and calculated 
that the terms are not consistent with international norms, 
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Table 1 |  Active and Potential Oil Companies in Uganda
Oil Company  Domiciled    Listed on US             SEC  Trades in US Reports to SEC
          Platform                    Registered
Tullow                   United Kingdom   No, AIM listed     Yes  Yes, ADRs Yes, no annual reports
Tower Resources/     United Kingdom   No, AIM listed      No  No  No
Neptune Petroleum
Dominion Petroleum  Bermuda    No, AIM listed      No  No  No
Total S.A.   France    Yes, NYSE listed      Yes  Yes, ADRs Yes, annual reports
Chinese National Offshore   China    Yes, NYSE listed      Yes  Yes, ADRs Yes, annual reports
   Oil Company (CNOOC)
AIM. Alternative Investment Market of the London Stock Exchange
NYSE. New York Stock Exchange
ADR. American Depository Receipt issued by US bank
and rather favor the oil company at the expense of the 
government and the citizens of Uganda. The analysis of at 
least one private bank (Credit Suisse)40 and one private 
auditing company (Ernst & Young)41 support this NGO 
position. As a result, activists have argued that the PSAs 
should be released to help improve future negotiations.
Of note, the government’s reluctance to release the PSAs 
contrasts sharply with the position of some oil companies 
operating in Uganda which have no problem with the PSAs 
being released to the public. Brian Glover, General Man-
ager of Tullow in Uganda, goes even further, suggesting 
that the government should disclose the PSAs:  “as we 
move closer and closer to production next year, one would 
like to think that the government would say (it) can make 
those available.”42
At least three pleadings have been filed in court over the 
release of the oil PSAs; two in the Magistrate Courts and 
one in the High Court. In the first case heard earlier this 
year, the Magistrate ruled in favor of the government by 
declaring the PSAs confidential documents based on the 
trade secrecy provision of the ATI Act. The judge in the 
case ruled that the complainants failed to prove that the 
release of the documents is in the public interest. The two 
Daily Monitor43 reporters, Angelo Izama and Charles 
Mwanguhya Mpagi (who were denied access to the PSAs 
by the Solicitor General in 2007, prompting their pleading 
in court), plan to appeal the decision.44
The case in the High Court was filed by Greenwatch,45 a 
public-interest environmental law NGO. Kenneth Kakuru, 
Greenwatch founder and Executive Director, argues that the 
release of the PSAs will not “prejudice the security or 
sovereignty of the State or interfere with the right to the 
privacy of any other person”—the two exemptions in the 
Constitution. He also argues that having information about 
the financial arrangements between the government and oil 
companies is important from an environmental perspective. 
In order to protect the constitutional right to a clean and 
healthy environment, citizens and civil society need the 
PSAs to assess impacts of the oil projects on the environ-
ment and public health. The PSAs will indicate whether or 
not the commitments made by companies on the environ-
ment undersell or over-promise. The case is scheduled to be 
heard in 2011.
Many advocates are not surprised that the government is 
withholding the PSAs from the public. In the early 2000s, 
the government did not release the Power Purchase Agree-
ment (PPA) between the government and Applied Energy 
System (AES) Nile Power which had been contracted to 
construct a hydroelectric dam on the Nile River at Bujagali 
Falls near Jinji. The government argued that the document 
must be kept secret because of confidentiality and trade 
secrets.46 Greenwatch went to court and, in 2002, the High 
Court ruled that the PPA did not fall under the two exemp-
tions to freedom of information in the Constitution (at the 
time, the ATI Act had not been enacted). 
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LOOKING TO THE SEC?
Given these developments, civil society groups in Uganda 
may need to look to the Wall Street Reform Act and the 
SEC in the United States for information on oil revenues 
paid to their government. Three oil companies are currently 
licensed to explore for oil and gas in five blocks in the 
Albertine Graben (Table 1): Tullow Oil holds Blocks 1, 2 
and 3A (including the proven oil reserves over Lake 
Albert); Neptune Petroleum (Uganda), a subsidiary of 
Tower Resources, holds Block 5; and Dominion Petroleum 
holds Block 4B. 
Tullow Oil47 is a global oil and gas exploration company 
headquartered in London, United Kingdom. Tullow’s 
primary listing is on the Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM)—part of the London Stock Exchange48 listing 
smaller companies—and is a constituent of the FTSE 100 
Index;49 it has a secondary listing on the Irish Stock 
Exchange. Tullow files some reports with the SEC,50 but is 
not on the list of foreign companies registered and report-
ing with the SEC and does not file annual reports. Tullow, 
however, trades in the United States as American Deposi-
tary Receipts (ADRs, Box 4); it is an issuer of deposited 
securities51 ($50M) with JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.52 
Tower Resources53 is a London-based, independent oil and 
gas company that is listed on the AIM. Dominion54 is an 
independent energy company founded in 2004 and domi-
ciled in Bermuda with a service center in London. Domin-
ion has been listed on the AIM since 2006. Tower and 
Dominion do not have shares registered under the U.S. 
Securities Act, are not on the list of foreign companies 
registered and reporting with the SEC, and do not file 
reports with the SEC. 
Tullow has rights over considerable and promising oil real 
estate in Africa. Recent exploration successes, especially in 
Uganda and Ghana, have helped make Tullow Africa’s 
leading independent oil company. With these finds, Tullow 
is seeking to transform itself from a company involved 
principally in exploration to one which is also engaged 
substantially in oil extraction. To speed up the process from 
exploration to extraction and to acquire the expertise and 
$8-10 billion investment needed to develop the Uganda 
oilfields, Tullow, in early 2010, proposed to sell one-third 
of its shares in its three blocks to French oil major Total 
S.A.,55 and another one-third of its shares to the China 
National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC).56
The sale of Tullow shares to Total and CNOOC was held up 
by a $408 million capital gains tax issue.57  The dispute is 
in the process of being resolved and it is expected that the 
Tullow-Total-CNOOC joint venture will be approved by 
the government. Total is registered and submits annual 
reports with the SEC, and trades on the NYSE. CNOOC is 
not on the list of foreign companies registered and report-
ing with the SEC, but trades in the United States through 
ADRs58 and files annual reports with the SEC (Table 1).59
The SEC has 270 days, from 21 July 2010 until April 2011, 
to develop regulations to help implement Section 1504 of 
the Wall Street Reform Act. The regulations will also help 
ensure the reporting requirements are robust and integrated 
into existing reporting protocols in order to promote 
seamless compliance. The rule-making process will 
determine a number of critical issues, especially regarding 
scope, that will establish which companies will need to 
Box 4 | What is an American Depositary Receipt?
An American Depositary Receipt (ADR) is a negotiable 
certificate (stock) issued by a US bank representing a 
specified number of shares in a foreign corporation that is 
traded on a US exchange, such as the NYSE and NASDAQ. 
ADRs are issued and sponsored in the US by a depository 
bank or brokerage firm, and are bought and sold on US 
financial markets like stocks from US–based companies. 
International companies that establish an ADR program have 
an option to choose from various types of ADRs. Level II 
(listed) and Level III (offering) depository receipt programs 
require that the foreign company be listed on the SEC and file 
annual reports (Unsponsored and Level I (OTC) ADR 
programs have only minimal reporting requirements with the 
SEC). 
The stock of many non-US companies trade on US stock 
exchanges through the use of ADRs. ADRs enable US 
investors to buy shares in foreign companies without the 
hazards or inconveniences of cross-border and cross-curren-
cy transactions. ADRs carry prices and pay dividends in US 
dollars.
Sources: American Depositary Receipts, US Securities and Exchange 
Commission, online at: http://www.sec.gov/answers/adrs.htm.
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comply with Section 1504 and which companies will be 
exempt from disclosing the revenue they pay host govern-
ments. Several issues are of particular importance for 
Uganda, including:
• Will all foreign companies that trade in the United 
States be required to comply with the Wall Street 
Reform Act?
• Will all companies that file reports with the SEC be 
required to disclose their payments, or only those that 
submit annual reports?
• Will qualifying companies be required to disclose 
project- and local government-level information, or can 
the information be aggregated?
• Which payments—taxes, fees, royalties and other 
transactions—must be disclosed in a disaggregated 
manner?
• Will companies be allowed to file exemptions from 
submitting certain reports and from making certain 
disclosures and, if so, under which circumstances can a 
company file an exemption?
If the U.S. law is narrowly interpreted by the SEC, Tullow, 
Tower and Dominion may not be required to disclose their 
payments to the government of Uganda. Total and CNOOC 
appear to fall under the law, but if Tullow is not required to 
comply, it is not clear if its partners in the joint venture 
would have to disclose their payments. Are Total and 
CNOOC “under the control of the resource extraction 
issuer” (Tullow)? The SEC must interpret Section 1504 od 
the Wall Street Reform Act broadly if the current group of 
companies operating in Uganda will have to disclose their 
payments to the government.
Oil companies and their associations and lobbyists have 
begun making their case to the SEC. They argue that 
disclosure of project-level and country-level information on 
revenue payments to host governments is competitively 
sensitive, may raise safety and security concerns, and must 
respect contracts and host country laws and regulations. 
They also argue that it would be prohibitively expensive to 
make such disclosure part of audited financial reports. 
While new procedures and data collection/analysis tools 
may be needed to disaggregate information, report on 
payments to host government and comply with the U.S. 
law, the promise of transparency and accountability in the 
extractive resources sector and of avoiding the resource 
curse far outweigh any costs associated with developing 
and implementing new reporting procedures. 
Moreover, oil companies have not been clear about how 
disclosure risks competitiveness. The unit production cost 
has been noted as a main company concern60 regarding 
competitiveness, but the information needed for competi-
tors to calculate or even estimate such costs does not need 
to be revealed in order to comply with Section 1504. 
Moreover, the risks that project-level and country-level 
information pose to competitiveness are often exaggerated 
by companies. Research shows that countries which require 
disclose of information on payments do not experience a 
loss of competitiveness and may even have reduced risks.61 
In many cases, much of this information is already known 
by the competitors through their own networks and deal-
ings with government.
If the SEC regulations establish that Section 1504 of the 
Wall Street Reform Act does not apply to all or many of the 
oil companies operating in Uganda, civil society will need 
to look elsewhere for support. The European Union (EU),62 
United Kingdom (UK),63 Spain, Canada, Australia, Hong 
Kong, Shanghai and other places are considering or have 
passed measures similar to the extractive industry provi-
sions in the Wall Street Reform Act. Stock market rules in 
the UK are of particular importance to Uganda since 
Tullow, Tower and Dominion are listed on the AIM of the 
London Stock Exchange.
Publish What You Pay (PWYP), Revenue Watch Institute64 
and other organizations are advocating for national stock 
market listing authorities to require all listed oil, gas and 
mining companies65 to disclose their payments. In the UK 
and other EU member states, listing regulations are gov-
erned by EU rules, although states have the authority to 
make their own rules. A 2004 EU Transparency Obligations 
Directive (TOD)66 calls on members to promote extractive 
company disclosure of payments to governments listed on 
European stock exchanges. Specifically, it states that “[t]he 
home Member State should encourage issuers whose shares 
are admitted to trading on a regulated market and whose 
principal activities lie in the extractive industry to disclose 
payments to governments in their annual financial report. 
The home Member State should also encourage an increase 
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in the transparency of such payments within the framework 
established at various international financial fora.” This 
call, however, is not binding or required, although a few 
member states (including the UK and Spain) have moved 
towards passing enabling domestic legislation. 
In the UK, the Financial Service Authority regulates the 
financial services industry and is the equivalent of the SEC 
in the United States. In 2006, the AIM introduced a 
requirement for all listed extractive companies to “disclose 
any payments aggregating over £10,000 made to any 
government or regulatory authority or similar body made 
by the applicant or on behalf of it, with regards to the 
acquisition of, or maintenance of its assets.” More recently, 
a more comprehensive and stronger bill has been discussed. 
The Financial Services Regulation Bill67—the British 
equivalent of the Wall Street Reform Act—was included in 
Queen Elizabeth’s Speech on 25 May 2010 and is currently 
before the Parliament.68 In addition to Tullow, Tower and 
Dominion and Heritage, some of the world’s largest energy 
and minerals companies are listed on the London Stock 
Exchange, including Gazprom, Anglo American and 
Xstrata. Regulations in the UK would also help ensure a 
level playing field for SEC-listed companies.
Whether the Wall Street Reform Act provides an opportu-
nity to promote transparency and accountability in Ugan-
da’s oil section depends in large measure on the SEC 
regulations to implement Section 1504. If the SEC rule-
making process establishes enabling regulations that cast a 
wide net, it will be an important step in ensuring sound 
revenue management in Uganda, promoting effective 
reinvestments, and fighting the corruption that contributes 
to the disjuncture between resource wealth and poverty 
reduction. If the SEC rule-making process results in 
regulations that narrowly interpret the transparency 
provisions in the Wall Street Reform Act, local NGOs may 
need look to the UK to help Uganda avoid the resource 
curse and press the British Parliament to pass the Financial 
Services Regulation Bill. 
Total gas station in Kampala, Uganda 2010 (Alisa Zomer)
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